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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
DON PUGH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent) 
vs. ( 
\ Case No. 11102 
CUMON STRATTON and RUBY 
ANDERSON \ 
Defendants-Appellants) 
.................................................................................. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
.................................................................................. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a replevin action brought by the Plaintiff-
Hcspondcnt as a livestock grower for the recovery of 
cattle sold to a livestock dealer who in turn sold the 
cattle to the Defendants~Appellants who purchased the 
cattle in good faith from the dealer at a livestock auc-
tion so.le in the ordinary course of business. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court found the issue for the Plaintiff-
... ~'~;pondcnt after submission of the case on the pleadings, 
a deposition and a stipulation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendants-Appellants seek a reversal of the 
lower Court's judgment and for this court to direct the 
10Y1cr court to enter a judgment of No Cause of Action 
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and also that the case be remanded for any further pro-
ceedings before a court of the proper venue. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There was no trial of the case below but rather the 
plaintiff filed a motion for a summary judgment after 
the pleadings were filed and a deposition of the plain-
tiff taken and at thP argument on the motion for sum-
mary judgment, the parties determined to submit the 
matter on the merits, based on the various pleadings, a 
short stipulation and the deposition. There was no sub-
stantial disagreement as to the facts alleged in the 
ple:iclings and affidavits. 
This action is in replevin and the plaintiff seeks to 
recover ten head of cattle from the defendant-appellant 
Stratton and eight head of cattle from the defendant-ap-
pellant Anderson. \Vrits of Replevin were served in each 
instance but each defendant supplied a re-delivery bond 
and kef)t possession of the cattle. 
On November 1, 1966 the eighteen head of cattle, 
alons with two other head \vhich are not the subject of 
this action, were sold by the plaintiff in Kane County, 
Utah to the Tri-State Livestock Auction, a licensed live-
stock dealer of St. George, Utah. Possession of the cattle 
was delivered to tlw dealer and the parties executed a 
comuination Bill of Sale and Sight Draft at the time of 
delivery. The Bill of Sale was executed to the dealer by 
the plaintiff who in turn received the sight draft which 
was later dishono1·ed by the Bank upon which it was 
drawn, State Bank of Southern Utah at Cedar City, Utah. 
Ho\\ ever, on :November 3, 1966 the Tri-State Live-
stock Auction, the dealer that had bought the cattle, sold 
the cattle at R l'l'gular cattle auction at their auction 
ring at St. Georg£', Utah to the defendants who bought 
in good faith and without notice and paid in cash the 
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full purchase price and each defendant took the cattle 
purchased to their respective ranches in Iron and Wash-
ington Counties, Utah. 
When the sight draft was dishonored, the plaintiff 
instituted this action against the defendants to recover 
his cattle. As is usually the case, the Tri-State Livestock 
Auction, the dealer, has gone defunct. Therefore, we 
have a situation where the plaintiff sold and delivered 
his cattle to a cattle dealer who did not pay but who in 
turn sold them to the defendants who bought in good 
faith, with the true wrong-doer now defunct and not a 
party to this action. 
ARGUMENT 
Point No. 1 
TITLE TO THE CATTLE WAS TRANSFERRED BY 
EXECUTION OF A BILL OF SALE AND DELIVERY 
OF THE CATTLE AND THEIR SALE THROUGH 
A REGULAR LIVESTOCK AUCTION. 
At the time of the sale and delivery of the cattle 
by the plaintiff to Tri-State Livestock Auction, the par-
ties executed a combination Bill of Sale and Sight Draft. 
The Bill of Sale is in the usual simple language of a Bill 
of Sale and it and the draft are as follows: 
- ' 
TRI-STATE LIVESTOCK AUCTION ____ .... No. 65 
Livestock Dealer Cedar City, Utah, Nov. 1, 1966 
At Sight, pay to order of Don Pugh ______________ $1,648.86 
Sixteen Hundred forty-eight and 86/100 ______ Dollars 
to: Tri-State Livestock Auction 
Thru: State Bank of Southern Utah 
Present for Collection 
By Harold Woodard 
Drawer 
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No. Kind or class Wgt. Price Totals 
10 WF Steer Calves 3298 $27.00 $890.46 
10 WF Heifer Calves 3160 $24.00 $758.40 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That I 
the seller hereunder, residing at _____________________________________ _ 
State of Utah, in consideration of the payment of the 
above draft have bargained and sold and by these 
presents do bargain and sell unto the drawer and to 
State Bank of Southern Utah, Cedar City, Utah the 
above described livestock and hereby hold myself 
to warrant and defend the title of said livestock 
against any person claiming the same or any part 
of them. 
DON PUGH 
It should be noted that the Bill of Sale is in the us-
ual simple language of a bill of sale used to transfer ti-
tle with the delivery of the property sold and was by its 
terms a present bargain and sell transfer. True it does 
provide that "in consideration of the payment of the 
above draft" but this is only the usual language of any 
bill of sale and does not mean that the transfer of title 
was conditioned upon the draft being paid. Plaintiff has 
never claimed that he held a recorded security interest 
or that this was a secured transaction as defined in our 
Uniform Commercial Code. Instead he has claimed that 
this was a "cash sale" and that he held a security inter-
est until the draft was paid. But such "cash sales" have 
for all practical purposes been done away with by the 
Uniform Commercial Code as hereinafter set forth. Fur-
thermore, it is clear that title passed with the delivery 
of possession and execution of the Bill of Sale. 
Section 70A-2-401 (2) Utah Code Ann. governs this 
situation and provides as follows: 
"Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to 
the buyer at the time and place at which the seller 
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completes his performance with reference to the 
physical delivery of goods, despite any reservation 
of a security interest and even though a document 
of title is to be delivered at a different time or place; 
and in particular and despite any reservation of a 
security interest by the bill of lading." 
Nothing remained to be done by the seller and the 
only thing left for the completion of the transaction was 
payment of the draft but this would not prevent title 
from passing because if that is all there is left to do and 
an instrument of transfer has been executed and posses-
sion of the property delivered to the buyer, title passes. 
After Tri-State Livestock Auction took possession, 
the cattle were taken to the yards and auction ring of 
the buyer at St. George, Utah and there were sold to the 
defendants at a regular auction in the ordinary course 
of business and the defendants were the bona fide pur-
c!1asers. 
Livestock auctions have become widespread through-
out the \\est in the past several years. They provide a 
clearing house, so to speak or an open market where 
one can have his livestock sold and where a buyer can 
find what he wants readily available. Some times the 
sale is a true auction where the Auction sells for an own-
er on commission and some times, however, the Auction 
itself has purchased the livestock and sells on its own 
behalf as was the case here. In fact livestock auction 
sales have come into such general use that our Legisla-
ture has enacted laws to govern such sales being Sec. 
tions 4-13-38 to 42, Utah Code and amendments thereto. 
Admittedly if livestock auctions sales were not regulated, 
t~1ey could easily become the old Market Overt of the 
common law in England where stolen property and prop-
e1·ty obtained by other dishonest means was taken for 
sale. Stringent regulations are set up to protect both the 
O\\'ner of the livestock and also the buyer. 
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Section 4-13-42 provides that the livestock when 
entering a sales ring shall be inspected by the brand in-
spector and they must be released and cleared for sale 
by him and therefore, he has to be assured as .to the 
right of the auction or owner to sell. This section pro-
vides as follows: 
"All livestock upon entering a livestock sales ring 
or a livestock auction sales ring shall be inspected 
for brands and marks by an authorized inspector of 
the state board of agriculture, and it is unlawful 
for any livestock sales ring or livestock auction sales 
ring to offer for sale any cattle or horses until the 
same have been brand inspected and released by an 
authorized brand inspector. 
"The operator of each livestock sales ring and live-
stock auction sales ring in this state shall furnish 
title to the livestock to the purchaser of all live-
stock sold through his or its sales ring. And it shall 
be the duty of such operator, when notified by the 
authorized brand inspector that there is a question 
as to whether any designated livestock sold through 
said ring is lawtully owned by the consignor thereof, 
to hold the proceeds received from the sale of said 
livestock for a reasonable time not to exceed 60 
days to permit the consignor to establish ownership 
and if at the expiration of that time the consignor 
fails to establish his lawful ownership of such live-
stock to the satisfaction of said brand inspector, 
said prnceeds shall be transmitted by such operator 
to the departme11t of agriculture, and the depart-
ment of agriculture receipt shall relieve said oper-
ator from furthl'r :cesponsibility from said proceeds. 
Said proceeds shall be handled according to sec-
tion 4-13-33." 
Therefore, when a buyer buys livestock at the sale, 
he is guaranteed title and since he must pay cash, he 
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has the right to expect title. He also has the right to 
expect that the brands and ownership to have been 
cleared for the sale. In this particular case, the brand 
inspector has supplied an affidavit of the brands and to 
whom the cattle were sold. We must assume further 
that he has also released the cattle for sale and he must 
have been satisfied as to the title to the cattle. When 
the defendants paid the purchase price and took away 
the cattle, as bona fide purchasers, they obtained title. 
These cattle, by being run through a licensed auction in 
the 01·dinary course of business became the property of 
tl:e purchasers. 
The Bill of Sale signed by the plaintiff was to Tri-
state Livestock Auction and to the State Bank of South-
ern Utah, the bank upon which the draft was drawn. 
This bank had possession of the draft and bill of sale, 
either in its own right or as agent for Tri-State Livestock 
Auction and the brand inspector must have been sup-
plied with evidence of title or he would not have cleared 
the livestock for sale. 
Respondent and also the Court below has placed 
almost entire reliance upon Section 4-13-17, Utah Code 
Ann. which provides that a Bill of Sale of livestock must 
be made out and accompany the livestock and that when 
the livestock bear the registered brand of some one other 
Cian the seller, any purchaser is put on notice to inquire 
as to the ownership. It is submitted this was done and 
the brand inspector, before releasing and clearing the 
cattle for sale at the auction, would have to satisfy him-
s0lf that everything as to title and ownership was in 
order. The defendants as the buyers at the Auction 
would ha vc no further duty to inquire because the law 
as to auction sales provides that the brands are inspect-
ed and the cattle must be released for sale before the 
auction sale takes place and the Auction must guarantee 
title. It is common knowledge that at such auction sales, 
the buyer does not bother to ascertain if the operator or 
selier has authority to sell or title because the law puts 
the duty upon the brand inspector and provides that 
the purchaser gets title. 
Point 2 
THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS AS PURCHAS-
ERS FROM THE CATTLE DEALER AT AN AUC-
TION IN GOOD FAITH OBTAINED TITLE AS 
AGAINST THE FORMER OWNER WHO HAD DE-
LIVERED POSSESSION TO THE DEALER. 
As pointed out above, it is the contention of the 
defendants that Tri-State Livestock Auction held the ti-
tle to the cattle and that the defendants obtained the 
title from the Auction at the sale. However, if for any 
reason title did not pass to Tri-State, title still was ob-
tained by the defendants. When the plaintiff turned 
possession of the cattle to Tri-State Livestock Auction 
he knew or should have known he was selling to an auc-
tion as a livestock dealer. On the Combination Bill of 
Sale and Sight Draft, was the name "Tri-State Livestock 
Auction, Livestock Dealer", as the buyer and drawer of 
the draft. The plaintiff testified he knew of the auction 
at St. George, Utah and he snould have known that the 
cattle would be resold by the Auction and that the per-
sons buying would expect title. 
Let us assume for the purpose of argument that 
the Bill of Sale did not transfer title to Tri-State but 
the title was to pass only upon and conditioned upon 
the payment of the draft. In other words that a "cash 
sale" was intended. However, title would still pass to 
the buyers at thP auction sale for the reason set forth 
below. 
For many years the rule of the law has been that 
in the sale of personal property, a seller cannot give any 
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better title than he has and if he has no title, his buyer 
gets none. In a great majority of cases this rule is just 
aad fair and with it the appellants have no quarrel. How-
ever, it was found many years ago that there were some 
situations in which it could not be applied and certain 
exceptions become grafted on to the general rule. In fact 
the Uniform Sales Act adopted by most states around 
the turn of the century and by Utah in 1917 contained a 
provision, which was Section 60-2-7, Utah Code Ann. 
1953, which, after stating the above general rule as to 
title, provided as follows: 
"Unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct 
precluded from denying the seller's authority to 
sell." 
A great body of law was developed which followed 
the above exception as did the State of Utah in the case 
of Heaston vs. Martinez, 282 Pac.2d. 833. There a whole-
sale automobile dealer in Denver, Colorado sold two au-
tomobiles to a used car dealer at Murray, Utah. The 
used car dealer brought the cars to his lot under an 
arrangement whereby the endorsed title certificates 
were sent to the First National Bank of Murray, Utah 
with sight drafts attached and the dealer promised not 
to sell the cars until he had picked up the title certifi-
cates and paid the sight drafts. He did neither but sold 
the two cars to good faith purchasers and the whole-
saler in Denver attempted to replevin the two cars from 
the good faith purchasers. This court held that the Den-
ver wholesaler, by delivering possession to the used car 
dealer, knowing he would put them on his lot for sale, 
was precluded and estoppecl from claiming the cars and 
that the good faith purchasers had title. 
The Heaston case was decided in 1955 and for some 
time before and until a few years after there were a great 
number of cases holding to this rule, one of which is 
Linton vs. Citizens State Bank, 368 Pac.2d 92 (Okla.). In 
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fact so many cases followed this exception to the gen-
eral rule in conferring title to a bona fide purchaser, 
that the compilers of the Uniform Commercial Code 
collected all these cases into one major rule rather than 
in an exception to the general rule as had the compilers 
of the Uniform Sales Act. It was found that in a number 
of cases a seller should be able to pass title to personal 
property even though he did not have title. Utah adopted 
and enacted the Uniform Commercial Code in 1965 and 
it took effect on January 1 1966 and this was also the 
repeal of the Uniform Sales Act. The rule under discus-
sion is now Section 70A-2-403 of our code. Therefore, 
we have a situation where the law has gone through a 
considerable evolution, made necessary by the needs 
of business, to have a simple uniform rule governing 
the transfer of title to a purchaser where the seller ac-
tually had no title. Section 70A-2-403 of our Uniform 
Commercial Code is as follows: 
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his 
transferor had or had power to transfer except 
that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights 
only to the extent of the interest purchased. A per-
son with voidable title has power to transfer a good 
title to a good faith purchaser for value. When the 
goods have been delivered under a transaction of 
purchase the purchaser has such power even though 
(a) The transferror was deceived as to the identity 
of the purchaser, or 
( b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which 
is la1er dishonored, or 
( c) It was agreed that the transaction was to be 
a "cash sale" or 
(d) Delivery was procured through fraud punish-
able as larcenous under the criminal law. 
(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a mer-
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chant who deals in goods of that kind gives him 
power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a 
buyer in the ordinary course of business. 
(3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquies-
cence in the retention of possession regardless of · 
any condition expressed between the parties to the 
delivery or acquiesence and regardless of whether 
the procurement of the entrusting or the possessor's 
disposition of the goods have been such as to be 
larcenous under the criminal law. 
l4) The rights of other purchasers of goods and of lien 
creditors are governed by the Articles on Secured 
Transactions (Article 9) Bulk Transfers (Article 6) 
and lJocuments of Title (Article 7). 
It will be noted that the above rule collects in one 
provision most of the classes of cases and the case law 
which had grown up prior to adoption of the Uniform 
Commercial Code and it is contended by the Appellants 
that in at least three different sub-sections of this rule, 
this case is covered. For instance the above section pro-
vides that when goods have been delivered under a tran-
saction of purchase to a purchaser, the purchaser has 
power to transfer title even though (b) the delivery 
was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored 
or ( c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a 
"cash sale" or (2) Any entrusting of possession of goods 
to a merchant or dealer who deals in goods of this kind 
gives the dealer power to transfer title to a buyer in the 
ordinary course of business. In particular it is felt that 
the above categories all apiJly to this case and particu-
larly Sub-paragraph (2) where possession is entrusted 
to a dealc1· or merchant. 
It is submitted that the adoption of this new rule 
was made necessary by a rapidly expanded sales of per-
sonal propc'rty where millions cf dollars worth of such 
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property are sold each day by dealers and merchants to 
persons who have a right to expect that the dealer has 
authority to sell and pass title. Yet under the lower 
court's ruling, the buyer from this dealer would have 
the duty in each instance of ascertaining first if the deal-
er had title. The speed at which business is now done 
and the millions of dollars worth of business transacted 
each day have made it impossible for the purchaser 
from the dealer to first inquire and satisfy himself be-
fore purchasing. 
Since the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code 
a number of works have come into quite general usage 
by the bench and bar, one of which is Anderson's Uni-
form Commercial Code. In this work there is a com-
plete discussion of Section 70A-2-403 above quoted and 
the history and reason for this rule is clearly set forth 
and this authority makes it clear that this rule was in-
tended to apply to the case before us and in fact fits 
the situation exactly. See Anderson's Uniform Com-
mercial Code, Volume 1 pages 279 et. seq. 
The enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code in 
Utah and particularly Section 70A-2-403 above quoted 
has made statutory the holding of the Heaston vs. Mar-
tinez case, supra. 
The respondent seems to contend and joined in by 
the lower court that for some unexplained reason the 
Uniform Commercial Code does not apply to livestock 
sales and that the Brand and Anti-theft Act is the only 
applicable statutes. But this Act, being Title 4, Chapter 
13 of our Code is concerned primarily with the preven-
tion of theft of liwstock and not with the situation here 
presented, which is a bona fide sale transaction. The 
Uniform Commercial Code is of general and wide appli-
cation, intended to cover sales of all personal property 
and there is no reason why it does not apply to live-
stock sales and specifically to livestock auction sales. 
13 
Section 70A-2-403 relied upon here is entirely consistent 
with Section 4-13-42 of the Brand and Anti-theft act be-
cause both are concerned with title passing in a sale 
from a dealer to a good faith purchaser and they are in 
no way inconsistent with each other. Even if Tri-State 
Livestock Auction did not have title, then the entrust-
ing of possession to it by the plaintiff made it possible 
for the defendants to acquire title when they purchased 
in good taith. 
Point No. 3 
THE PROPER VENUE FOR THIS ACTION WAS 
WHERE THE CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE OR 
WHERE THE DEFENDANTS RESIDE AND THE 
MOTION FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 
In this action a motion for a change of venue was 
filed by the defendants and denied by the court. The de-
fendants earnestly contend that the lower court should 
have granted the motion as the county in which the ac-
tion was filed was not the proper county. 
As shown by the pleadings and affidavits below, 
the cattle were sold and delivered by the plaintiff to Tri-
state, a livestock dealer, in Kane County, Utah. Tri-
state then took the cattle to its yards and auction 
ring at St. George in Washington County, Utah. At the 
auction sale two days later, part of the cattle were sold 
to the defendant Stratton and he took them to his ranch 
and residence at Hurricane, Washington County, Utah 
and the remaining cattle were sold to the defendant an-
derson ancl she took them to her ranch and residence at 
Beryl in Iron County, Utah. When the action was filed 
in Kane County, Utah the cattle were still in Iron and 
Washington Counties and their owners resided there. 
The Sheriff's return shows that he found part of the 
cattle at :Ccryl, Irnn County in possession of the defend-
14 
ant Anderson and the remaining part of the cattle were 
found at Hurricane, Washington County, Utah in posses-
sion of the defendant Stratton. It is highly possible that 
there should have been separate actions below but this 
point was not raised. However, the action should not 
have been filed in Kane County but either in Iron or 
Washington Counties. 
The plaintiff has proceeded on the theory and fol-
lowed by the Court below that the cattle were converted 
by Tri-State Livestock Auction in Kane County, with a 
tint of fraud or mis-representation and that the buyer 
took possession in Kane County and therefore, this was 
the proper county. This may have been true had the ac-
tion been against Tri-State but it is not a defendant, 
but instead two people who bought the cattle and took 
possession in Washington County and then took them to 
their respective ranches where they were when this ac-
tion was commenced and where the two defendants re-
side. No action could have possibly have arisen as 
against these two defendants until they took possession 
of the cattle as replevin is a possessory remedy. One 
would think from the pleadings and theory of the plain-
tiff that this action is against TriState but it is not and 
instead it is two buyers from the Auction who are de-
fendants. 
As to where actions are filed in Utah is governed 
by statute, being Title 78, Chapter 13 of the Utah Code. 
There it is specifically provided where different kinds 
of specific actions must be filed, none of which is reple-
vin and then Section 70-13-7 provides that "in all other 
cases, the action must be tried in the county in which 
the cause of action arises or in the county in which the 
defendant resides at the commencement of the action." 
Since this section is applicable to this case, then it 
should have been filed and tried where the defendants 
reside or where the cause of action arose, neither of 
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which could be Kane County. True the chain of events 
which led to this action commenced in Kane County 
where the possession of the cattle was turned to the 
buyer and had this buyer, Tri-State been joined as a par-
ty defendant, Kane County might conceivably have 
been a county where the action could be filed. But Tri-
state is not joined and therefore the only cause of ac-
tion is against the two buyers and as to them, Kane 
County was not the proper county. 
The common law rule in replevin was that if the 
defendants took possession lawfully or not tortiously, 
a demand was necessary as a condition precedent to 
b1·inging the action and the cause of action would arise 
at the place where demand was made and the refusal giv-
en. In fact the old Utah case of Woodward vs. Edmunds, 
57 Pac. 848 so holds and therefore, the cause of ac-
tion could not have possibly have arisen in Kane Coun-
ty. Also the Utah case of Nebeker vs. Harvey, 60 Pac. 
10::?9 held that the County where the demand is made 
a•1d refusal to return possession is the proper county 
for replevin and cites the Woodward case. Also the case 
of Floor vs. Mitchell 41 Pac. 2d 281 (Utah) construes 
Section 78-13-7 and holds that "in all other cases, the 
action must be tried in the County in which the cause 
of action arises or in the county in which the defendant 
resides. In such causes, the plaintiff has not the option 
and if he brings the action in the wrong county, he must 
yield to a change of venue when properly and timely 
dcm;indecl." It would appear that section 78-13-7 is con-
elusive and that an action in replevin must be brought 
citl~ce in the county \Vhere the defendants reside or 
where the cause of action arose neither of which was 
Kane County. 
SUMMARY 
In summary the Bill of Sale executed by the plain-
lG 
tiff passed title to the Tri-State Livestock Auction and 
it in turn passed title to the defendants who purchased 
at the auction. But even if the title did not so pass, still 
the purchasers at the auction obtained title for the rea-
son that possession of the cattle was delivered to and 
entrusted to a livestock dealer and it is common knowl-
edge that a dealer buys and sells. Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code the entrusting of possession to the 
dealer gave the dealer power to pass title to good faith 
purchasers in the ordinary course of business and this 
would be so even though the plaintiff intended a "cash 
sale" dependent upon the payment of the draft which 
was actually dishonored. But even so, Kane County was 
not the proper county in which to file and try this ac-
tion and the motion for a change of venue should have 
been granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ORVILLE ISOM 
Attorney for Appellants 
